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HONG KONG AS A FINANCIAL CENTRE OF GREATER CHINA

1.

Introduction

During the past three decades , Hong Kong has emeτged as one of the leading
international financial centres (IFCs) of the world. Since China began its economic reform and
open-door policies in 1979 , and since cross-strait economic contacts began to improve in the
m泊-1980s， Hong Kong's role has also bccome more varied and multi-faceted. The purpose of
this paper is to evaluate Hong Kong as an IFC of Greater China (whi ch cOlnprises Mainland
China, Taiwan , Hong Kong and Macau). The territory's prospects as an IFC after Íts
retrocession to China on July 1, 1997 will also be discussed .

II.

Some Misconceptions

We may begin by disposing of two common misconceptions aboutHong Kong as a
financial centre. The first one, surprisingly prevalent in the West , is that Hong Kong is an
1 、位h 立坦白 na坦坦Lcer立旦~r"offshore banking centre". Even respected scholars commit this
solecislTI (Dufey and Giddy , 1978; Johns , 1992).
To understand our argument , it would be useful to quote the definitions of n offshore
financial centre" and "offshore banking centre" by two authorities . Roberts (1994a) states
"The term 'offshore financial centre' came into usage in the 1960s to describe a
new phenomenon - the operations of financial centres which , though physically
located wíthin a country , have little connection with that count句's financial
system. ....... Offshore financial centres form a third tier in the hierarchy of
international financial centres , perfonning a narrower and more passive range of
financial functions than the global or the regional international financial centres
But unfortunately the distinctions are not clear-cut; for instance) by some
yardsticks London and Switzerland are leading offshore financial centres because
of their pre-eminent roles in the euromarket. An other possible source of confusion
is the inconsistency in the terminology used in the literature on the subject : in this
context , 'offshore financial centre' and 'offshore banking' are used interchangeably
with 'international banking centre' and 'international banking' ."
According to J ohns (1992) ,
"Offshore banking is a qualitative rather than a geographically explicit locational
term. It can apply either to : (1) banks that have located purposely in specific
foreign jurisdiction, not necessarily island-based , whose legislative and tax
frameworks and regulatory authorities are less restrictive in comparison with their
home-based operational environment~ 仗， to (2) specifically designated facilities or
financial 'free' zones with their own separate customised legislative and tax
regimes , available to domestic and/or foreign banks , which are exempted from all
or specific regulatory controls and taxes on international banking activities that
otherwise apply in the rest ofthe local economy."

From these definitions , it is c1 ear that Hong Kong is not an offshore financial centre
The Hong Kong Government has never set up an 0宜shore centre or free zone with special
regulatory or tax concessions , and which is completely insulated from the domestic economy.
ln fact , the authorities do not even distinguish between residents and non-resident , or
domestic and foreign currency financial activities , on a substantive legal or administrative
basis. Hewson (1982) recognizes this when , in an exhaustive study of offshore banking , he
acknowledges that "Hong Kong is not really an offshore centre in the sense that we have
developed that term" even though "there are important offshore activities conducted in Hong
Kong" (p .4 25). ln other words , onshore and offshore activities are completely fused together
in Hong Kong without any artificial barriers between them.
The other misconception is that Hong Kong is the third largest lFC of the world. Not
surprisingly, this view is largely confined to Hong Kong and China, though some foreign
observers also subscribe to it. 1 The exact basis for this ranking has never been c1 early spelled
out , though it has been vaguely suggested that the number of foreign banks and other financial
institutions is the third largest , or the intensity of foreign bank activity is the third highest , next
only to London and New York.
In my book (Jao , 1997) , 1 have used an extensive set of quantitative data to rank Hong
Kong as a financial centre. Obviously the details cannot be reproduced here , but Table 1
presents Hong Kong's rankings in Asia-Pacific and the world according to a number of
specific criteria.
As may be seen from the table , :tIong Kong can be regarded overall as the sec~
largest financial centre in the Asia-Pacific_regiQp , being behind Tokyo but an豆豆豆!可 喜lngapore.
At the global level , Hong Kong is also very strong in international banking, and can be
regarded as the fourth largest international banking centre (IBC). But mc is not equivalent
to IFC: when financial markets other than banking are taken into account, Hong Kong's
world ranking become rnuch less impressive. Overall , Hong Kong's 'Ncighted world ranking
was 6 .4 7 in 1995 , i.e., Hong Kong was between the sixth and seventh largest IFC of the
world.2

III What Kind of a Financial Centre is Hong Kong?
How do we then characterize Hong Kong as a financial centre? Financial centres may
be c1 assified according to their purpose, geographical reach , and historical development.
From the teleological standpõlnt , Hong Koñg is a functional centre, i.e., one where financial
activities and transactions really take place, which generate substantial income and
employment , both direct and indirect. Despite its low tax rates and narrow tax base, Hong
Kong is not a tax haven , and therefore is not a paper centre (or brass-plate centre) which is
used to book transactions in order to evade taxation , and whìch generates little or no income
or employment. Hong Kong is also an integrated centre, where onshore and offshore markets
are completely integrated , as opposed to an segregated centre , where onshore and offshore
markets are clearly demarcated. (In other words , once a financial institution is admitted into
Hong Kong , it can engage freely in any financial transaction or activity, whether onshore or
offshore , whether with residents or non-residents , or whether denominated in domestic or
h叫n curren的吵
2

Table 1
Ranlcing ofHong Kong as an IFC , 1995
C ategories

Asia-Pacific Ranking
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Banking:
N o. of foreign banks
Banks' foreign assets
Banks' foreign liabilities
Cross-border interbank claims
Cross-border interbank liabilities
Cross-border credit to non-banks
Syndicated loans and note-issuing
facilities (NIF s) (1994)
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Forex Market:
N et daily turnover
Derivatives Market:
N et daily forex contract turnover
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Overall
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Stock Market:
Market capitalization
Value traded
No. of listed domestic companies

3

唔，EA

4

Gold Market
1iζJtI

Insurance:
No. of authorized insurance companies
Premium income
Qualified actuaries

2

Fund management
N .A. = not available
Source: Y.C. Jao , (1997)

3

N.A.
27
N.A.
N .A.

From the geographical perspective, IFCs can be further sub-divided into global
financial centres (GFCs) and regional financial centres (RFCS) .3. By general agreement , there
are only three _GFCs in the world , namely , London , New York, and Tokyo (~obe肘， 1994b)
Hong Kong is not in the same league as the three GFCs. It is o n1y a 、 RFC J or more
specifically, the second largest financial centre in the Asia-Pacific region. 4
From the historical point of view, scholars have distinguished between the traditi9.旦旦l
centre, the financial entrep釘， and the offshore banking centre (Dufey and Giddy, 1978). (J he
traditional centre is one which serves as a net capital .e xporter to the world either by bank
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As Greater China is a sub-set of the Asia-Pacific region , Hong Kong can be regarded ,
by logical reasoning , as an IFC of Greater China as wel1. However, there are other more
compelling reasons for doing so) as will be explained in the next section. Moreover, after the
transfer of sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong will also become China's offshore financial centre,
for reasons that will also be explained shortly. Note however, that the term "offshore financial
centre" is used advisedly here from China's point of view. From Hong Kong's own point of
view, the territory remains an integrated IFC

IV. Hong Kong as an IFC of Greater China: Some M句 or Determinants
In this section, we will explain the reasons for treating Hong Kong as an IFC of
Greater China, apa此企om the simple logical reasoning mentioned above.
The first factor is obviously Hong Kong's 、political neutrality. Al though China always
insists that it wiU seek reunification by peaceful means , it also steadfastly refuses to renounce
the use of force as a means of last resort. Taiwan , on its pa此， despite the lifting of martial law
against "communist rebellion" and liberalization of cross-straits contacts, still refuses to accept
Beijing's "one country, two countries" model or its demand for direct economic contacts
Hong Kong , fortunately , is not burdened by the legacy of the Chinese civil war. It is the only
Chinese city where economic , cu1tural , or even political contacts between the two sides of the
Taiwan Strait can, and do , take place in a normal atmosphere free from political hostility or
interference
Second , Hong Kong has an unrivalled record for economic freed函n. Two US think
tanks , Heritage Foundation and the Fraser Institute , have recent1y ranked Hong Kong as the
country (territory) with the highest degree of economic freedom (Johnson and Sheehy , 1996 ~
Gwartney , Lawson and Block, 1996). Both China and Taiwan , especially the former , lag very
considerably behind Hong Kong.5 (As a concrete example in the field of banking and finance ,
it is universally agreed that the complete freedom of capital movement and the full
convertibility of the domestic currency are the most important hallmarks of an IF C) Only
Hong Kong satisfies this condition fully. In China, the domestic currency, Renminbi'(R孔1B)，
has been convertible for current account transactions on1 y since December 1, 1996. In
4

Taiwan, exchange control on the current account has long been removed; however, control on
capital account still exists for capital movement in excess of US$5 million for individuals and
US$20 million for tìrms
l Third , Hong Kong's record of national treatment and reciprocity is also second to
none) TJ:t~空巨型.Lof "nationaltreatment" forms J?_~rt of '!þ_egrinciple of "non-discrimiIl'也妞
one 已f the main pillars of 伽
t he
昀eG
臼e缸吋
n1
/、
As enshrined in Art icles 1 and III ofGATT , the 市10St favoured nation" (孔位'N) clause requires
that, subject to certain exceptions, imports from all sources should face identical barriers,
while "national treatment" requires that, once through the customs, foreign goods are subject
to no taxes or regulations more onerous than those on equivalent domestic goods (Winters ,
1990). Since then the concept has been extended to direct investment and the tìnancial sector
A previous study (J ao , 1988 , pp. 20-1) shows that Hong Kong had the best record of
"national treatment" in the Asia Pacitìc region in 1986. Recent reports by the U.S. Treasury
have reconfirmed this finding (US Department ofthe Treasury, 1990 , 1994)
The 1994 report contains complaints against 33 countries or regions , including China
and Taiwan , for failing to accord full "national treatment" to foreign banks and financial
institutions , but none against Hong Kong. It says that "U.S . institutions generally give
authorities high marks for fairness and transparency and generally expressed the view that
Hong Kong does not discriminate in terms of competitive opportunities. Activities are
conducted on an equal legal and regulatory footing with both local and foreign institutions"
(p. 267)
A separate concept is "reciprocity" , which essentia l1 y means according foreign banks
or other tìnancial institutions the same treatment domestic banks or other tìnancial institutions
receive abroad. In practice, many countries interpret "reciprocity" in a negative or restrictive
sense, or use it as a bargaining device in bilateral negotiations. Hong Kong, however, tends to
interpret the principle in a liberal or positive sense. According to the Hong Kong Monetary
Authority (HK此1A) ， the "reciprocity" required is "avaîlability of some acceptable form of
reciprocity to Hong Kong banks" , or in other words , absolute equality in mutual granting of
6
banking licences is not required . This has given rise to a situation whereby Hong Kong is
under-represented in some countries or territories which nevertheless have a large banking
presence in Hong Kong. China and Taiwan are good examples , which wi!I be detailed in the
next sectlO n
刊Fou吋h， although China since 1981 has advocated the three direct contacts across the
至tr哇j; (àirect commerci剖， navigational and postallinks, or the 旦且也旦g policy), Taiwan has so
far adaman叫 yr閃efi
缸郎
1站S記ed tωo li 丘 the embargoes on such contacts) Trade , investment , and financial

flows across the strait sti Il have to be routed or arranged through Hong Kong . For example ,
while Taiwanese banks are forbidden to deal direc tI y with PRC-owned or controlled banks ,
their branches in Hong Kong are permitted to do business with their PRC counterpa吋 s . Hong
Kong in other words is the natural intermediary by virtue of geography, language, culture and
other ethnic ties , between China and Taiwan , whose economic exchanges have been booming
since the mid-eighties. Al though there are signs that Taiwan may be moving closer to the
旦旦旦時 policy， imminent lifting of the embargoes is not in sight , given the political tensions
which have dominated cross-strait relations during 1995-96

LF or all these reasons , Hong Kong serves as the tinancial entr咐t of Greater China)
( China, Taiwan, and Macau, are all eager to make use of Hong Kong's freedoms and excellerÍt
facilities to engage in activities or transactions which are either prohibited , or are unavailable,
within their respective domestic borders.)
V.

Indicators ofHong Kong as IFC of Gr eater China

In this section, we present some quantitative evidence of Hong Kong as an IFC of
Greater China. A1though in principle the whole gamut of financial variables should be used ,
we agree with Reed (1981) that banks and banking business remain the core ofan IFC. Space
constraint also prevents us from treating non-bank intermediaries exhaustively.
China in 1996 had 35 banking institutions in Hong Kong's 3-tier system, namely , 18
licensed banks (削l-service banks) , 2 restricted licence banks , and 15 deposit-taking
companies. These institutions can transact all types of banking business , whether onshore or
offshore, or whether in local currency or foreign currency. In addition , China had equity
interests in at least four other Hong Kong incorporated banks.
The market shares of China-owned banks in deposits , loans and advances , and total
assets are given in Table 2. China-owned banks as a group is now the second largest banking
group in Hong Kong, next only to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
(HSBC). Moreover, in 1994, the Bank of China became the thírd note-issuing bank in Hong
Kong , and now shares with the two existing British note-issuing banks, the HSBC and the
Standard Chartered , the chairmanship of the powe的11 Hong Kong Association of Banks by
rotatI on.

Table 2
Market Shares of China-owned Banks in Hong Kong (end-1995)
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Source: lIong Kong Monetary Authority Annual Report for 1995

By contrast , at the end of 1994 only 12 Hong Kong banks had branches in China
Actually , 7 of them are China-owned banks incorporated in Hong Kong. Moreover, none of
them is allowed to engage in RMB-denominated business. 7
6

The same lack of reciprocity applies also to Taiwan. Taiwan's bank are late-comers to
Hong Kong , but in the past five years, no less than four top Taiwan banks have had their
representative offices upgraded to branches. However, so far only two Hong Kong
incorporated bank have been allowed to establish branches in Taiwan.8
Apart from banking institutions in the 3-tier system, in 1996 China also had 3
representative offic郎， 18 trustee/nominee companies , 10 investment or brokerage companies ,
9
4 finance companies , and 13 insurance companies in Hong Kong.
Taiwan had about 8
10
investment or brokerage companies in Hong Kong in 1994.
Hong Kong's role as a financial entrepôt manifests itself also in the external c1 aims and
liabilities of Hong Kong banks vis-à-vis banks and non-bank customers in China and Taiwan ,
Table 3 gives the position with regard to China in both Hong Kong dollar and foreign
currencles.

Table 3
External Liabilities And Claims of Hong Kong Banks vis-à-vis China
(HK$

Liabilities to banks in China

million)

Claims on banks in China

Liabilities to non-bank
customers in China

Claims on non-bank
customers in China

HK$

FC

HK$

FC

HK$

FC

HK$

FC

79 ,716

60 , 528

29 , 156

75 ,097

343

3 ,979

1, 843

45 ,640

1992

74 , 570

76 , 574

32 , 123

80 ,849

920

5,591

2 , 822

53 , 123

1993

67 ,228

87,814

37, 171

101 ,471

645

5,923

2 ,732

53 , 561

As at end of

1991

1994

99 ,408

126 ,367

47 , 597

129 ,012

1,371

6 ,476

1,895

59 ,744

1995

110 ,867

105 ,553

52 ,230

171 ,634

2 ,822

6 ,494

2 ,439

62 , 575

1996(Nov.)

123 ,651

162 ,844

65 , 826

221 ,605

3 ,008

8,624

3 ,357

67.257

Note:

FC

foreign currencies

Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority Monthly Statistical Bulletin

The table shows that liabilities to and c1 aims on banks and non-banks in China have
both been increasing su咖
I
Hong Kong dollars to banks in China, but net c1 aiins in foreign currencies on them) (F or non- 行
bank customers, Hong Kong had net liabilities to them in Hong Kong dollars , but nèt c1 aims 、
on them in foreign currencies .) 坦竺些竺些竺竺哩 "Ho旦巨型g banks" in c1udes actually many
China-owned or controlled b'anks based in I-!()nL~o.!:l:g. (T o that e胸前， the table shows that
China-owned banks use actively Hong Kong's facilities 、 to transact business which wou的
o伽
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( Hong Kong is a leading syndication centre of 伽 world， given 伽
85 h抑制的日蚓出eir presence in Hong Ko吵

of 伽 top

100

b祕s of 伽 w州 some

As there are also a large number of Chinese banks in Hong Kong , the territory is
therefore the natural centre for arranging bank loans to China. According to Chen Yuan, the
Executive Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China，可0% of syndicated loans for use
in mainland China are arranged in Hong Kong" (Chen , 1996).

(Ho時 Kong is not ju圳 banking centre, but also _a 呻tal=-rai叫 centre， for Chi~a) Q3 Y
the end of 1995 , 17 Chinese state-owned enterprises (the so-called H-shares) had been lisÚ~d
on the Stock Ex~hange of Hong Kong (SEHK) , raising more than HK$20 billion (about
US$2 .6 billion).l j In _adql!i9 nJ here were_39 _ "~~g ~_~~ 些~h~ _end of 122豆，此-，- HQngKong
listed companies in which China_had _acquired controlling interests (L泊， 1995). Moreover ,
"over 40% of the companies listed in Hong Kong have participated in almost one thousand
investment projects in mainland China, with a total investment of about HK$500 billion (about
US$64 .6 billion). The total market value of Chinese enterprises listed on the Hong Kong
stock market is almost HK$100 billion (about US$12 .9 billion)" (Chen , 1996).
Hong Kong's banking transactions with Taiwan are not as large as t~ose with China,
but as shown in Table 4 , they have also been growing steadily since 199 1. lQ-enerally, Hong
Kong had net claims in both Hong Kong dollar and foreign currencies on banks in Taiwan, but
f had net liabilities in both Hong Kong dollar and foreign currencies to non-banks in Taiwa
This shows that Taiwan banks borrowed heavily from the inter-bank market in Hong Kong,
but Taiwan's individuals and firms held net credit b伽ces in the Hong Kong banking 酬emJ
Taiwan has so far no companies listed on the SEHK.
Table 4
External Liabilities and Claims ofHong Kong Banks vis-à-vis Taiwan
(HK$ million)

As at end of

Liabilities to
banks in Taiwan
HK$
FC

Liabilities to non-b剖11<
customers in Taiwan
HK$
FC

Claims on banks
in Taiwan
HK$
FC

Claims on non-bank
customers in Taiwan
HK$
FC

1991

231

11 ,1 79

615

40,676

626

9,877

71

3,650

1992

231

5,501

813

45 ,403

1,041

10 ,916

119

4,288

1993

348

6, 161

1,092

52 ,302

1,353

12 ,584

837

4,961

1994

562

5,983

1,327

58 ,999

1,676

16,078

598

5,433

1995

570

7,861

1, 179

45 ,283

2,010

18 ,873

193

8,536

1996

564

15 ,604

1,346

37 ,977

2,685

19 ,7 89

315

8,465

Note:

FC

foreign currencies

Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority
8

Hong Kong is also playing the role of a mentor for China's f1 edgeling stock markets -both the reopened Shanghai market and the brand-new Shenzhen market ‘ It is well known
that the regulations , organization, and listing rules etc. of these two markets are largely
modelled after that of SEI召ζHong Kong accounting firms also regularly advise Chinese
state-owned enterprises to bring their accounting practices up to international standards
(Cheung , Yeung and Yeung , 1992; Hu , 1993; and Ayling and Jia啥， 1994). Lln 1993 , the
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) , the regulatory body of the securities industry in
Hong Kong , signed a menlorandum agreement with Îts counterpart in China for mutual
cooperation and exchange of information and personne1. A similar agreement \;v as also signed
b川e SFC with its 1 仰an cour叫仙n 1995)

An IFC does not however exist in a vacuum
to be viable. an IFC must be
complemented or supplemented by other roles Thus，但!J.l2.鎧迎 with its rise as an IFC , Hong
Kong has also emerged as a major regional business centre , the most obvious evidence of
which is the fact that hundreds of multinational corporations use Hong Kong as their regional
headquarters. According to the Hong Kong Government Industry Departmen
"regional headquarters" is defined as "an organization which has control over the operations
of one or more other offices or subsidiaries in the region without the need to make frequent
r的叫s to , or consu 1t with , the overseas parent company or h叫quarters") Tables 5 and 6
present the number of such companies by source countrγduring 1990-96 , and their
geographical jurisdictions
Table 5
Hong Kong as RegionaJ Headquarters by Source Country of Ultimate Parent Companies
Source Countr立
USA
Japan
UK
China
Germany
Francc

Netherlands
Switzerland
Taiwan
Bermuda
South Korea
Canada
Australia
Italy
Sweden
Denmark
Liberia
Others

Source:

1990
252
20
77

1991
258
44
75

1992
206
74
73

13
29
31
34

30
25
31
31

28
25
24
33

11
14
16
14
70
581

9
11
14
8
70
606

1993
182
88
81
67
26
21
26
25

10
9
10

1994
178
91
91
62
35
26
22
34
14

1995
198
116
94
71
33
22
28
23
22
17
16

1996
188
122
90
85
40
26
30
27
25
16

14
14

8
96
596

11

13

88
629

137
717

16

147
793

148
829

Industry Department, Report 0n且已旦旦近旦姐姐坐坐缸里sentation 垃Overseas Companies in
E旦旦旦豆豆旦g，

various years
9

Table 6
Ar ea of Responsibility of Regional Headquarters (1996)
Ar ea responsible

N o. of companies

-

(a) Hong Kong and China

314
(38.5%)

(b) South East Asia (excluding China)

45
(5 .5%)

(c) South East Asia (i ncluding China)

172
(2 1. 1%)

(d) East Asia

94
(1 1. 5%)

(e) Asia Pacific

191
(23 .4%)

816
(l 00 0/0)

Total
一

L 一一

Coverages: South East Asia (ex c1 uding China) refers to Hong Kong , Taiwan, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Thailand , Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam;
East Asia refers to South East Asia (including China) plus Japan and Korea;
Asia Pacific refers to East Asia plus Australia and New Zealand
Notes :

1. Percentages in brackets indicate the share of the total number of regional
headquarters.
2. Figures may not add up to the total due to rounding

Source:

Industry Department，旦哩旦此 on the 1996 SuI主旦旦旦f Regional Representation by
Overseas

COIn旦旦IlÎ es

in Hong Kong

10

Several 伽
fea
切a
b
前
切t 伽
firms using Hong Kong as regional headquarters can be regarded as a mirror
imag~ of the concentration of multinational banks and other financial institutions in Hong
Kong) ~n吋
ldeed， the 1996 survey also shows that 129 firms , or 15.8% of the total , are in the
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multinational companies followed a fà缸irl
吋ly consistent uptrend 企
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om 581 to 829.) To be sure ,
there have been changes in the source countries. (Thus, US representation fel( by 25% from
252 to 188 , but the US remained the largest source country.) Úapan's representation rose
dramatically by more than six-fold to 122.) Sl叩叫19ly， (已espite the i訂lpendi~已 transfer of
sovereignty, the UK's representation also ificreased from 77 to 90 , or by 17%. Ä.Third , since
1993 , multinational corporations 企om China and Taiwan have also appeared . .on the scene)
(Fou口h， Greater China was the focus of the geographical responsibility 汗 。 be more precise,
every multinational corporation had at !e<!st two members of Greater China (Hong Kong being
the host) within its regional purview) lIn short , the data presented above provide a solid
evidence that 、 Hong Kong is both the international financial centre and business centre of
Greater China. I
mul扯tinatiωona
叫1

V I. Hong Kong's Prospects Aft er 1997
As the date of reunification draws nearer , speculations about Hong Kong's future have
also intensified. Understandably, there are diverse views , some of them diametrically opposed ,
about Hong Kong's prospects in the post-colonial era.
~ As far as Hong Kong's role as an IFC of Greater China is concerned , my own view is
that it depends on the validity of the following six major premises ) that there will be a smooth
transition for Hong Kong from a British Crown Colony to a Special Administrative Region
(SAR) of the People's Republic of China;)that China will strictly observe its commitments and
obligations under the 1984 Joint Declaration and the 19 9,9 Basic Law, and allow Hong Kong
to enjoy a high degree of autonomy without interference~1hat China will continue t.2 pursue its
market-oriented economic reform and open-door policies c;m a permanent basis;ιtihat crossstrait relations will not degenerate into military conf1ict;\51hat China will maintaiQ stable
external relations with the major industrial powers , particularly the United States;~ánd that
Hong Kong will preserve all the favourable internal factors responsible for its past success
(such as the rule of law, good and efficient government, business-friendly tax regime ,
transparent regulatory framework , use of English etc., quite apa此 from the comparative
advantages alr 叫 mentioned in吋枷圳
Sec
臼叫
e
叫叫
cttion
圳
∞
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My considered opinion is 由
t ha
羽t these six premises , on the whole , will probably hold ,
though not in the ideal manner as one would hope. Moreover, of the six premises, Hong
Kong can control the last one only. China is involved in all the rest. China therefore bears a
heavy responsibility for the well-being of Hong Kong after 1997, including its role as an IFC ,
which China professes to take very seriously.
The fourth premise, about the relations between China and Taiwan, is likely to be the
most troublesome. Unfortunately , Hong Kong has no influence whatsoever over it. The
territory can only pray that the three parties involved in the triangle , China, Taiwan, and the
United States , will all exercise the utmost restraint in order to avoid a war the consequences of
11

which are too horrible even to contemplate. China has its legitimate concerns about what it
considers as Taiwan's separatist tendencies. But it must realize that the best way to achieve
reunitication is by peaceful dialogue and "demonstration effect" of its impressive economic
development. The tactic of intimidation which China employed during Taiwan's recent
presidential election had not only proved utterly futile , but had alienated world opinion and
damaged its own image. Taiwan, for its pa討， should realize that any independance movement
is not only against the wishes of the Chinese people all over the world , but is also against its
own interests. Taiwan should also abandon its provocative attempt to rejoin the UN, from
which it voluntarily withdrew in 1971. If it is so keen to rejoin 祉， it should negotiate with
China for a mutual1y acceptable formula (e.g., the "Olympic model") of representation. Last
but not least, the United States should adopt a more even-handed approach towards China and
Taiwan, and be wary of the powerful pro-Taiwan and pro-independance lobby, whose
demands , to say the least , do not coincide with the interests ofthe United States. 12
Even when the six major premises generally are valid , Hong Kong still has to face
growing competition 企om other tinancial centres, both established and emerging.
Unfortunately, space does not permit a detailed discussion of this topic. Here we must be
content with some cursory remarks on the potential challenges from Shanghai, Taipei and
Singapore. 13
Our analysis in Section IV already implies that Shanghai and Taipei cannot play the
role of IFCs of Greater China because of political hostility and relatively poor records of
economic 仕的dom， national treatment and reciprocity. Before W orld War 11, Shanghai was
the premier financial centre of the Far East, surpassing even Tokyo. The Sino-Japanese War
(1937-45) and the subsequent civil war (1946-49) sank Shanghai's status as the leading
regional financial centre. No less unfortunately for Shanghai , for nearly 40 years , the new
regime pursued what in effect were policies of "financial repression": expulsion of Western
banks and other financial institutions, wholesale nationalization of private banks and other
intermediaries, closure of all financial markets , and a crushingly heavy fiscal burden on
Shanghai (White , 1989). (It was not until 1990 that this "financial repression" was corrected
by a series of measures àimed at the restoration of Shanghai's former status as a m句 or
financial centre: the announcement of a new economic zone (the New Pudong Ar ea) , the
reopening of the stock exchange in 1990, and the establishment in Shanghai of two national
financial markets , the forex market in 1994, and the inter-bank market in 1996.) However, 40
years of neglect and perverse policies have left their marks.
Taipei was much more fortunate in being spared such a long period of "financial
repression". In 1993 , Taiwan announced with considerable fanfare an ambitious plan to
develop itself into an "Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Centre (ROC)'\The ROC concept
comprises six elements , of which one is financial centre. However, an official feasibility study
(Ministry of Economics, 1994) concludes that while Taiwan is ahead of Hong Kong in respect
of science and technology, trained manpower, land supply, industrial network , and industrial
production, it lags behind Hong Kong in respect of economic hinterland, transportation ,
telecommunications, financial services, legal system, administrative efficiency, tax incentives,
marketing, and regional headquarters , all essential ingredients for an IFC. An other more
recent study (Economic Development Commission, 1997) also confirms that Taipei is far
behind Hong Kong as a financial centre, maritime centre, air transportation centre, and
telecommunication centre
12

This is not to belittle the potential of Shanghai and Taipei. Both are already important
domestic financial centres (DFCs). However , until they can completely remove all exchange
controls, permit full convertibility of the domestic currencies, and adhere fully to the
international standards of national treatment , reciprocity and regulatory transparency, neither
can be IFC in the true sense of the word. And of course, until China and Taiwan resolve all
their political differences , neither Shanghai nor Taipei can serve as an IFC of Gr eater China
The only other financial centre that can challenge Hong Kong is Singapore. Indeed,
the two have been keen rivals for nearly thirty years. So far Hong Kong stiU has an edge, but
it is so slight that Singapore can surpass Hong Kong easily, particularly if the 1997 transition
is not managed well. l1.; However, as far as Greater China is concerned, Singapore is more
distant , both economically and geographical妙， than Hong Kong. To be sure, Singapore is the
undisputed financial capital of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia , and it is also cu1tivating
assiduously the Chinese Connection. The fact remains , however , that Singapore can hardly
compete with Hong Kong , in view of the latter's many advantages, as the IFC of Greater
China.

VII. Con c1 uding Remarks
Hong Kong's rise as a leading IFC during the past qua討 er of a century is one of the
two outstanding economic achievements of the territory in the post WorldWar II era, the
other being its transformation from a mere entrepôt into a modern industrial economy. As a
financial centre , Hong Kong is now wearing several hats: the second largest IFC of the AsiaPacific region , the 6th or 7th largest IFC of the world , the only IFC or financial entrepôt of
Greater China, and an offshore financial centre of China after the transfer of sovereignty in
1997. 的

Hong Kong's future as an IFC depends crucially on China's goodwill and rational
behaviou r. Provided that the "one country, two systems" model , and its financial counterpa此，
the "one country, two currencies" model , which implies Hong Kong's financial independance ,
can be shown to work, and provided that China devotes its energy and resources to peaceful
economic development , Hong Kong's potential could be limitless. Even at the end of 1996 ,
Greater China, with a combined population of 1,23 1 million , GDP of US 叭， 086 billion, forex
reserves of US$220 billion , and foreign trade of US$867 bi1l ion , was already a formidable
economic force . ln 25 years' time , China alone will probably become the largest economy of
the world (in terms of total GDP , 110t 旦旦E 豆但也 GDP) . ln a peaceful setting of sustained
economic growth , Hong Kong , as we l1 as Shanghai , Taip剖， and Singapore , cannot fail to
prosper together as IFCs or DFCs.
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Notes

For example, a French expert writes: "Hong Kong est la troisième place financière du
monde. Elle est de plus en plus considérée comme une a1ternative à Tokyo par les
investisseurs étrangers d的irant s'instal1 er en Asie orientale. Les banques intemationales
y sont plus nombreuses qu'à Paris ou à Tokyo (560 banqu郎， dont 360 succursales de
banques étrangères" (Cini , 1993 , p. 11 7).
2.

The weights 1 used were: banking, 40 0/0; forex market , 20%; equity and debt markets ,
25%; derivatives , 10%; and others, 5%

3.

A "region" in this context means a supra-national geographical area (say one or two
continents) , not a sub-national one.

4.

The term "Asia-Pacific region" refers to countries or territories along the western edge
of the Pacific Ocean, inc1 uding China, Japan , Taiwan, Hong Kong , Korea , Brunei ,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand , Australia, and New Zealand

5.

The Heritage repo討 ranks Taiwan 8th and China 12 1th among 140 countries. The
Fraser report ranks Taiwan 16吭， but does not in c1 ude China, among 103 countries.

6.

See An nex A "Criteria for Authorisation" , Hong Kong Monetary Authority 1994 An nual
Repo此.

Banki眩，

7.

U nderlying data in Almanac of China's Finance and

8.

See "List of Financial Institutions" , Einancial Statistics 弘10nthly， Economic Research
Depa此me肘， The Central Bank of China, Taiwan. Note that the HSBC is no longer a
Hong Kong incorporated bank as it changed its legal domicile to the U nited Kingdom in
1990.

9.

Underlying data from "List ofHong Kong companies having Chinese interests" , Industry
Department , Hong Kong Government.

10.

Hong Kong Economic Journa1, Oct. 23 , 1994.

11.

Addendum to Ihe 1996-97 Bud 穹的， Hong Kong Government , p. 28.

12.

The Taiwan Strait crisis began in the summer of 1995 after President Lee Teng-hui of
Taiwan paid a "personal" visit to the United States.
Originally, the Clinton
Admínistration, mindful of China's sensibility, refused to grant a visa to M r. Lee.
However, Congress , in an anti-China and pro-Taiwan mood , passed overwhelmingly a
resolution welcoming Mr. Lee. The move was especially gratuitous , since only a few
months earlier, China's Chairman Jiang Zemin issued a conciliatory appeal to Taiwan to
improve cross-straÌt relations.

14

1995 , pp. 677-680.

13.

In my book (Jao , 1997), there is a whole chapter dealing with competition from other
centres

自nancial

~I

15.

In J ao (1997) , 1 use 30 economic and financial variables to compare Hong Kong and
Singapore as IFCs. 1 find that Hong Kong leads on 16 counts, while Singapore leads on
10 counts , with 4 remaining variables more or less neutra1. This finding is supported by
a respected credit rating agency , Political and Economic Ri sk Agency Ltd ., which
recent1 y rated Hong Kong as having the best financial system in Asia , ahead of both
Singapore and Japan. See "Asia Financial Landscape" , in Asian Intelligenc~， May 15 ,
1996.
Technically，扎1acau

can also be an offshore financial centre after sovereignty reverts to
China in 1999. However, Macau is too small to be a centre. In reality, Macau is only an
economic appendage of Hong Kong
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